

Truman administration recast existing anti-Asian stereotypes to demonize North Koreans and Communist Chinese and win popular support for the Cold War. Despite these appeals, the limited and inconclusive war did not generate public enthusiasm.

In a particularly strong chapter on the Vietnam War, Brewer shows how and why similar tactics failed spectacularly when applied to the ambiguities of the conflicts in Southeast Asia. Exposure of the dishonest and misleading justifications for the war sparked intense domestic controversies and shattered the Cold War consensus. Brewer closes with a cogent analysis of the flawed propaganda strategies used by George W. Bush's administration during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Neither "perception management" nor stinging attacks on the war's critics resulted in sustained public support for the protracted, expensive conflict. Official justifications for the war, including Saddam Hussein's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and professed U.S. desires to create a model democracy in the Arab world, did not survive media scrutiny and public skepticism.

Throughout the book, Brewer skillfully interweaves political and diplomatic history. She addresses the formulation and implementation of U.S. propaganda strategy within the federal bureaucracy and examines how journalists, filmmakers, and advertising executives collaborated on these initiatives. She demonstrates the impact of government censorship on popular opinions about war and those attempting to challenge official narratives about conflict.

Brewer's treatment of the notorious 1918 lynching of Robert Prager, a Socialist critic of World War I, contains a very minor error. The episode occurred in Collinsville, Illinois, not St. Louis (p. 69). This quibble aside, Brewer has done a remarkable job of explicating six distinct conflicts while repeatedly demonstrating how U.S. officials have misled Americans in wartime.

Brewer's wonderful writing style and impressive research are the book's major strengths. She draws on manuscript collections, pamphlets, advertisements, cartoons, radio transcripts, and memoirs with originality and zest. The book is beautifully laid out and illustrated. Although scholars such as David Kennedy, Allen Winkler, George Roeder, and Steven Casey have examined pieces of the story Brewer tells, no single volume better synthesizes the history of U.S. propaganda efforts. *Why America Fights* is a great fit for undergraduate courses in the history of U.S. foreign relations and deserves a wide audience among academics and lay readers alike.



Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott and the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. xvi + 340 pp.

Reviewed by John Soares, University of Notre Dame

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes has written a well-researched, engaging, and forcefully argued book about a fascinating episode in Cold War sports diplomacy. The subject is President Jimmy Carter's attempt to organize a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olym-

pics in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but the book also deals with the efforts of Denver and Los Angeles to host Olympics, the awarding of the 1980 Games to Moscow, and Olympic competition at Lake Placid and Moscow in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1984. Sarantakes argues that the collision between Carter and International Olympic Committee (IOC) president Lord Killanin should have been a mismatch in Carter's favor because Washington had so much more power at its disposal. But as the book demonstrates, political, diplomatic, and military strength was sometimes trumped by soft power. IOC members and National Olympic Committees (NOCs) were required to be independent of their governments, and U.S. allies could not simply dictate what "their" NOCs and IOC members did; sports officials in several countries allied with the United States sent Olympic teams to Moscow despite Carter's efforts.

Sarantakes might have made more of the fact that in Communist countries IOC members and NOCs were *not* independent, a point demonstrated when all Warsaw Pact members except Romania joined the Soviet-led boycott of Los Angeles—without any provocation comparable to the invasion of Afghanistan. IOC officials endlessly proclaimed their desire to ensure "that sport or sportsmen are not used for political purposes" (p. 31), but Communist regimes routinely did just that—except on occasions when it served their purposes to mouth platitudes about keeping sport and politics separate. IOC officials knew that East-bloc NOCs and IOC members were not and could not be independent of their governments. Once accepted into the Olympic movement on their own terms, the Communist states had no reason to alter their practices, and they did not. Instead the IOC accepted wholesale departures from its rules rather than risk appearing to take sides in the Cold War. As part of their politicization of sport, Communist regimes touted Olympic victories as proof of their superiority. Although Sarantakes downplays the political importance the Soviet regime attached to the Moscow games, Soviet authorities stressed the political dimension: "By awarding the organisation of the Games to Moscow the world sports leaders basically approved the peace-loving foreign political course of the Soviet government" (statement of USSR Committee for Physical Culture and Sport, quoted in Evelyn Mertin, "The Soviet Union and the Olympic Games of 1980 and 1984: Explaining the Boycotts to Their Own People," in Stephen Wagg and David L. Andrews, eds., *East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War* London: Routledge, 2007, p. 238).

Given the realities of international sport, organizing a crippling Olympic boycott would have been difficult. Sarantakes argues that the idea of a boycott was misguided. For political impact on sport, he is impressed by Jesse Owens's multiple gold medals at the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Owens made a mockery of Nazi racial ideology, but his heroics also demonstrated the limits of soft power. His achievements did not trigger a rethinking of Nazi racial policy, nor did they stiffen European resistance to Adolf Hitler. Even a West German diplomat in 1980 "remarked that a boycott of the Berlin Games in 1936 might have altered history" (p. 80).

Still, a more competent diplomatist in the White House might have done a better job of using the Olympics to make his point. Sarantakes is justifiably scathing in his assessment of Carter in this case, with reference to Carter's foreign policy more

generally. Sarantakes shows Carter immersed in detail but missing the bigger strategic picture. He treated allies with contempt. He cost himself diplomatic flexibility by imposing an early deadline for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He targeted his diplomacy toward governments rather than the sports officials actually making decisions about Olympic participation. He tried to organize an alternate sports festival even though international sports federations, whose support was essential, would never agree, to say nothing of the logistical impossibility of organizing in a matter of weeks what Olympic host cities needed five or six years to do. Sarantakes argues that Carter's boycott efforts even "mutated into an attempt to destroy the Olympic movement" (p. 11), although his own research shows the administration did not take steps, such as anti-trust action against the IOC, that would have been pursued by those committed to the movement's destruction.

This book is an important case study of soft power's role in international relations; it should be required reading for anyone interested in Carter's foreign policy, Olympics and politics, soft power in the Cold War, non-governmental organizations in international relations, or the intersection of sports and politics. Despite the book's many strengths, it occasionally goes off on digressions unrelated to its main argument, especially about Olympic hockey at Lake Placid and operational details of the early stages of the Soviet invasion. The section about Lake Placid hockey introduces several minor problems.

The book also needed better editing. Liechtenstein, the tiny Alpine principality whose skiers performed remarkably well at the Lake Placid Olympics, deserved to have its name spelled correctly (p. 203). The country exemplified the dilemmas facing sportsmen and politicians in democratic societies in 1980. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Liechtenstein legislature voted to boycott the Moscow Games. Sovereign Prince Franz Josef had the authority to overrule that vote, and he was an IOC member. But he would not veto the will of his people, so he took the honorable course and resigned from the IOC.

Principled men, like Carter, Killanin, and Franz Josef, had to make difficult decisions concerning peace and sportsmanship in 1980. The traditional willingness of Communist regimes to engage in blatant politicization of sports complicated their efforts. Sarantakes has impressively described an epic battle over sports and politics and illuminated the diplomatic shortcomings of Jimmy Carter. This contribution to the emerging literature of sports and the Cold War deserves a wide readership.



Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, eds., *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2010. 265 pp. \$70.00/£40.00.

Reviewed by Nicholas J. Cull, University of Southern California

Cultural diplomacy has emerged in recent years as a significant field of both international practice and scholarship. The drivers of this have included an international cri-